The Economics of Enforcement: The Case of OSHA by Marlow, Michael L.
Ebforcement:Thehe Economicsics of n rcement: 
~Jbe Case ofOSHA 
Michaell L. Marlowl 8flow 
" ......,...' 'U IIIII I1..11 b ... 
bind• ., CBIA I 0 II nit 
.... 'ps tile dr.t tI _bl .. 
......,OIIIA .
 
r••_ lin ~ ••II .... 
tile 1M IIIItIIII EI~"" ... 
INTRODUcnONDUCIION 
The OccUpatiODai Safetyfety andd Healthalth (OSH)H) Act of 
1970970 providesrovides forr safe:yafe~y regulationgulation of 5 millionil ion 
workplaces 
cupational 
rkplaces. Thisis law is oneeoftheemanyany newew typespes of 
regulationgulation i troducedntroduced in thee 1970s970s to regulategulate thee 
economyconomy on a nationWIde basis.asis. A majorajor problemoblemtionwide 
thatat hintJers policylicy makersakers i  thee effectivef ective enforcementnforcement 
of suchch regulation.gulation. Enforcementforcement of thee actct is thee 
i ders 
responsibilitysponsibility of thee Oa:~lpationaJ Safetyfety Q~ i Healthalth 
Administrationinistration (OSHA).SHA). 
,uncluded thatat OSHAA hasas 
aztpational a-4 
Previousevious researchsearch asas ~ncluded 
nott exertedxerted a significantignif cant impactpact on regulatedgulated firms.l nns. 
Cheliuselius (J974) andd Smithith (J97S) findd thatat OSHAA hasas1974) (1975) 
nott exencd a significantignif cant impactpact on injuryjury rates,tes, andnd 
Cheliuselius concludesncludes thatat evenven thoughough injuryjury ratestes 
decreasedecreased afterfter thee OSH Act,t, theseese decreasesecreases arere nott 
relatedlated to OSHA butt ratherther to dropsrops in businesssiness 
activityctivity andnd youngung workerrker employment.ployment. Gleasonason andnd 
erted 
Barnumrnum H97S) findd th~t thee costssts imposedposed on firmsr s11975) et 
forr noncompliancencompliance arer  trivialrivial in 'omparison withith thee 
investmeisrs unrelatedrelated to thee 
*omparison 
opportunityportunity costssts off vestme., lS 
correctionr ection off violations.i lations. Viscusicusi (1919) concludesncludes thatat 
OSHAHA hasas failediled to exertxert a significantignif cant impactpact on thehe 
979) 
actualctual orr plannedlan ed safety investmentsvestments off firms.ir s. 
Thisis paperaper examinesxamines thee powersowers of OSHAHA byy 
developingeveloping a modelodel off enforcementnforcement thatat detailsetails thehe 
lety 
impactpact OSHAHA cann exertxert on firms andnd yieldsields insightssightsl s 
intoto this agency's historicalistorical progressrogress towardward legislatedgislated 
goals.oals. It differsif ers fromom previousrevious tudiesstudies in thehe followingl owing 
isagency’  
ways.ays. First, thishis paper examinesxamines thee efToctiveness offYirst, p lfectiv ness 
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initialitial andd reinspectioninspection programsograms whereasereas in thee 
Etamum (1973,studytudy oy Gleasonason andd Barnum 97S~ forr example,xample, 
onlyly initialitial inspectionsspections arere considered.nsider d. Second,cond, thisis 
confutes penalized,modelodel nfmes violationslations to thoseose thatat arere nalized. 
fib-mnott totaltal violations.lations. Whenen a Irm expectsxpects withith greatreat 
certaintyrtainty to bee foundnd in violationlation butt nott penalized,nalized, it 
hass lesss  incentivecentive to considernsider correction.r ection. Third,ird, thisis 
paperper doeses nott considernsider thee impactpact of OSHAA on 
injuryjury rates. To thee extentxtent thatat injuriesjuries arere thee resultsult oftes 
“unsafe” engicccring controls,bothth " nsafe" job habitsbits andnd ngineering Olltrois, 
OSHA’s will insignificant's impactpact on injuriesjuries iU likelyely bee signifIcant 
fromm zeroro sinceince it doesoes nott controlntrol thee job habitsabits of 
workers.’ Fourth,rkers. I nh, thisis paperper analyzesnalyzes nforcementnforcement o  
thee statetate andnd nationaltional level.vel. Onee of thee characteristicaracteristic 
problemsroblems withith previousrevious researchsearch is thatat analysisnalysis off 
enforcementnforcement parametersramet rs basedased on aggregateggregate datata 
close thesedoeses nott providerovide informationformation on howw 1"se theloC 
valuesalutlS arere to thee parameterramet r valueslues derivederived on a statetate 
basis.asis. Thisis paperaper offersf ers insightssights intoto thee issuesue off 
whetherether previousrevious researchsearch providesrovides bothth reliableliable andnd 
generaleneral results.sults. 
Sincei ce thee presentresent studyudy mostost closelylosely resemblessembles thee 
studytudy byy Viscusicusi (lq79), separateeparate andnd detailedetailedC" 9~ a 
discussioniscussion off thee importantportant differencesif erences betweenetween theseese 
twoo is presentedresented here.ere. Onee differenceif erence is thatat Viscusicusi 
assumess umC3 workersrkers desireesire constantnstant workrk placelace quality,uality, 
resultgeneratingenerating thee suit hatat workersrkers cannotnnot increasecrease 
theireir realal wagesages byy increasingcreasing theireir personalersonal levelvel off 
controlntrol effort.f ort. On thehe contrary,ntrary, wee arguergue thatat if 
exertsOSHAA xens a significantignif cant effectf ect on firms,irms, it causesauses 
workersrkers to becomeecome moreore safety-consciousafety-conscious sinceince m-­
’ see DcpatmcIlf cmuaace (m77). only recaltly.I S e U.S.. . epartment of Commen:  1m). O l  ecent y, andnd 
VetyrsrrlY.hsVC~~~M~liebkforurrpafeactsbYvery nrely. ave the courts held tinns liable for unsafe acts by 
employees.ployees. See.e. forr example,xample, Brennantwim v.. OSHRCSHRC andnd Conradnrad 
Precson Indwtrirs 1137).isiollindas ie (22 OSHCHC (137). 
players would attachch relativelyti ely higher premiumsi s too  
personalal safetyfety control. In addition. if OSHA  were 
to increase risk workers,. 
i , 
able ,lse informationi  on to 
OSHA  would have the power to increasese both the 
markett wageses and the costs of firms.s. The opposite 
conclusioni  is found by Viscusi:is i: as OSHA  increasesses the 
control efforts of firms.. workers decreaserease their levell ofl s 
personalnal control.l. Thisis cOP-elusion leadss Viscusiis  to ahe 
following policy consideration:ration: therere is a dangerr thatt 
stringentnt enforcemente ent may increasease work hazardsr s 
onclus  t  
becauseuse 01 decreasesreases in the personalnal control efforts ofol 	 lTorts r 
workers.rs. This paper's condu~ion is quite different:rent: if1 r’s clusi  	 l 
OSHAA is to increasese injury control. it mustt increasese its 
levell of enforcement.rcement. 
l,
The otherr major difference betweent een this paperr andi nce 
Viscusiis i concernsrns the testingting of the enforcementf r ement modde! 
Viscusiis i examinesines the impactct ofcertain ('SHA pen"lt:~ 
mspection investmentt ent in contlctll:i 
i  CY3HA nLIt:{ 
and In ection variablesi les on 
equipmenti ent by firms and workerr injury rates.tes. No 
significant relationships ip is found betweent een thesese varia­&ant 	 i -
bles afterter it  is  recognizedgnized thatt OSHA's historicall use of  
enfcrcement to 
’s USA
forcement sanctionsctions havee causedsed triviall coststs 
firms.s. This paperr recognizesgnizes thatt previous studiesi s 
havee foundd triviall costs to firmss and addressesres es the 
followinging questions. How mayy OSHA  affectffect the 
complianceia  of regulated parties?i  Has OSHA  affectedflii ted 
certaintain segmentsts of  the nation',' To  what levell musti ’.’ 
sanctions he raised to affectt complianceia  ,,'gnificantly?b  	 . i if l  
El'iFORCEMENT MODELDELNFORCEM NT 
EffC\:tive enforcement of  Iules relies on both  infonna­
tion gatheringri  and penalizingli  activities.ti  Informationformation 
gatheringt r  IS the acquisitioni ion of informationormation on the 
compliance decisionsi  of firms.s. Searchesrches mayy take 
lTeclive l l forma-
manyny forms:r s: inspection. monitoringi ri  activity. and 
complaintl int informationti  from outside parties.r  The 
ction, tivity, 
principali i al meansans by which OSHA  :;athers informationtig&  
on complianceli nce activitytivity is throughh work placee inspt..'C..spev.. 
[ions. During fiscalcal 1977977 OSHA  conductedted 196.0786.078 
snspections.’ Penaltieslties forr detLytL4 violations arl 
l.lons. 

inspections.1 etectl."<i c 

nenserious an4 Eactusuallysually	 off two  types:es: o erious rd serious.ious. ad. 
nonserious violation.i . with a civili  pl:nalty of up to 
Sl.OOO.W . ic%b 
n s 	 e l
hass a directct relationshipl ti ship to job safetyfety and 
healthlth butt probablybly would not I.'ause deatht  or  
wiou,, :nJury.’ a signifi­i ili-
c  
:.;eriou~;	 r*;irriesm r .·\ A  seriousrious violationti  ~''. ries 
cantnt plObability thatt deathath or seriou.' physicalsical harmr  
I:ouldc  [l.'Sultwsuft andd assumesssumes thee cmphyer knew. or 
~2o ility riou.r, 
e l:)yer w, clr 
shouldl  haveve known of. thee violation:lf, iol;ition.” 
----~_._----
t See Offtel: of Managementagement Data and Statistical Analysis (1977). 
3’ OSHActtl9701.Act (\970,. Sec.. 11 (b), 
* kofficeof t ndStatisticalAnatysis(1977). 
7( ). 

’ Ad (i970). !k.
• OSH ct 1970). Sec. 177 (b).). 
Together ~he informationi  gatheringri  and penalizingli i  
powers ofagenciesencies lead to potentialti l costs to violators.. 
Botht  activitiesi  are neededded togeneraterate an expectedcted loss 
for a firm out of  compliancee witht  various rules.. Forr 
t  
exampk. If a regulatedl ted firm expectsts witht  greattle. d
certaintyi ty lO be found in violation but not penalizedli edto
for a violation. it will have less incentiveti  to correctt the,
violation. When appliedli  in combination. the IOSpec­i , ~ospec-
tion and penalizingli i  ,h l;vities determiner ine whetherr itai C  
"pays" for lirm~ to complyl  with rules.s.“ s” irmr
A  descriptionri ti  of the cost function for the firm inlir
some statete of noncomplianceli ce isclole 
ci = C(a!,i’,, li, x, pi) 	 (I)(1) 
wherere 
c,C', =	 expectedected costt in dollars for violation of 
rule i,. for i= I. 2•. ", t1, *-a,q 
probabilityili  thatt OSHA  acquiredir d informa­
tion on compliancel ce for all q" rules 
i', =	 penaltylty in dollars for violation of rule i,. for 
i= I, 2. ..., ,I 
"- =	 -
;  . .. . '/ 
I.; = vio-percentageentage of inspectionsti s that penalizealize ­
lations of rulel  i. for i=  I,1, 2, ...,•. .• '/rl 
= percentage vio-n	 n.,'c tage of inspectionstions thatt penalizealize ­
hnions of att lcast one rulelat  e st 
Pi = costt in dollars assOCiated with continuedisoc ted 
violations of rule i. apartrt from penalties. foralties, 
i=; 1. ***i""" I. 2..... 'I.. ‘1. 
Thehe firstrst four argumentsents are calledll d policyl  parame­
tersrs becauseause theyy representresent valuesl s determinedtermined hy 
ra e-
OSHA. which appliesli s its discretionaryti ary enforcementf rcement, 
powerr to innuence thee expectedected c('sts of noncompli­fl ce c’stsc pli-
ancece forr partiesrties with individual rules through appli­li-
cationsti s of thesese policy parameters.ra eters. The remainingaining!icy 
argumentsents arere l:allOO cost  parametersr eters becausecause theyey 
IT'n7:asure~ re allll otherr coststs not directlyctly relatetil te4 to 
enforcement.f rcement. 
Alll fourr typeses of policyli  parametersr eters exertert positiveiti  
I dlkd 
effC\:ts on thee expectedected coststs of noncomplianceli nce forr thee 
firm.l . 0(s1reflects 
fects 
Parametereter nects the frequencyuency aspectpect of 
inspections;ctions; thee morere conducted,inspectionsctions Ofl ted. the 
morere firmsl  mayay expectpect to be foundd in violatio:l.ti :l. 
Parameterseters i'.,j measureasure one aspectspect of thee intensitynsity 
character'sticr ctef tic ;; inspections;1' ection,,; thee greaterater thee valuel e of 
alll  i'i' the greaterater thee potential costt from violationi  of 
rulel  i.. Parametereter 7l:n representsresents thee ratete of penalizingenalizing alll  
violations of rulesl s by OSHA  during inspections.ections. Both 
.,, utial 
frequencyquency and intensitynsity characteristicsracteristics arere alliowed 
for.r. The remainingaining typeses of policyli  parametersra eters arere the 
l d 
potentialential penaltiesalties finns facee for specificecific violationstions of 
rulel  i observede  duringi g inspections.ections. 7,. 
lirms 
Valuess of I'i 
representresent lhe intensitynsity characteristicsracteristics of  penalizingnalizing 
activity.tivity. whileil  frequencyuency aspectspects are displayedlayed in ii.Ai' 
pi 
 
Cost parametersters P representsent all other costs that 
may be incurred by a firm subjectt to inspection.ti . Whilel  
thesese parametersters may representsent many ditTerent typessRe t 
of  costs. we confine our  discussioni  to the impactt ofs, 
inspectionti  on workers' wagc:s. While workersrs are 
consideredsidered safety-conscious,ty-conscious, they do  not possessss 
perfectrfect information on the various risk characteristicscteristics 
’ es. i  
associatedciated witht  alternativetive emple-yments, and markettlqments. 
wagess do  not reflect perfectrfect compensationtion for occup­
ationali nal risk.k. OSHA  mayy increasese information on risk 
tl ct p-
toworkers through its identification ofnoncomplyingl  
firms,s, which would increasese markett wagess and the 
iI i  
costs of the firm as well.l . Butt the degreegre  of identifi­
cationtion dependspends on the characteristicsracteristics of thee rulele sett 
nt fi-
thatat OSHA enforcesforces on firms.s. There is l"vidence thatte nce 
OSHA's enforcementforcement programram is nott aimedi ed att dis­
seminatinginating mformationIOf ation on previouslyviously unperceivedperceived 
been 
’  i -
risksks to workersers andd thatt consequentlysequently it hass nott h en 
sU<X.'essful .,t increasingreasing worker's compensationpensation forucc sful i:  r’s 
previouslyviously unl.:ompensated flsk.5 Owing to thee prob­
ablele triviali ial impactact on marketrket wagesges exertederted by 
U Lv pensatcd ri k.‘’ -
OSHA. thee effect of alll  Pi on thee costssts of noncompli­
ancece is assumedssumed to be positivesitive andd constant.stant. 
, lf ct pi compli-
The losss functionction for the regulatedgulated firm is definedfined! e 
asbash 
~1 
ry,&fl (2) 
ii=II 
E(L)=  LC :%"ii'j n ( ! 
whereere ii =1. 2, ..., '7 denotes thee comple~e sett of rules.les. 
This functionction utilizestilizes alll  thee policylicy parametersrameters in 
 . .  .. q noies ple’e 
equationuation (I) f') determinetermine thee relevantlevant charllcteristics 
of thee incentiveentive structuretructure facingcing firmss forr compliancepliance 
t3 aracter stics 
withith rules.les. This lossss functionction hass seven~1 interestingteresting 
propertiesr perties regardinggarding thee effectivenessffectiveness of enforcementforcement 
veral 
activityctivity on thee compliancepliance decisionscisions of firms.s. First. 
nott onlyl  thet e ab~olutesolute level 
t, 
l \el of penaltynalty impositioni osition 
definesefines thee expectedpected costssts of violations;l tions; the irequencyquency 
andnd intensitytensity characteristicsaracterist cs togetherether determinetermine thee 
r e 
valuelue ofthe lossss potential.tential. Second,firms mustst bee citedited the cond, fi s 
and penalizednalized forr violationsl tions to affectf ect hee costssts of theireircl 
noncompliance.ncompliance. For example,xample, ifi  OSHA observed,served, buttI-IA 
nott penalized,nalized, violationsi lations of rulele i.i. itt "ould haveave a 
trivialrivial impactact on thee preregulatoryreregulatory costssts of firmsi s forr 
nott adoptingdopting rulele i.i. 
would 
, See Bolle (1977)( ) lIJIdComell and Weingasl (1976).L.%c lk ad tnell eirq st :19 ). 
• A similari ilar functionti  isi  developedl  ini  Gleasonl  and Barnum \;975).� t@ t tn tl ). 
The functionti  ini  ourr study.t . though.t . confinesi  violations onlyl  tot  tIJo.~ei l tt  thtx;  
thatt t have been penalizca.dized. 
Thehe function in de&sloss equationi  (2)) fines the 
expectedcted loss facingi  firms in noncomplianceli ce in a time 
period that had not been previouslyviously inspectedected in a 
givenn jurisdiction.iction. Itt is thisi  costt thatt firmss weighigh 
againstainst the returnsturns from alternativetive investments.t ents. 
Assumess  there is an alternative investmentt ent the sizei  of  
the outlay necessaryces ary for compliancepliance with OSHA rulesl s 
in a giveni en period.riod. Iff thee returnturn on thisis alternativelternative 
investmentestment is greaterreater thann E(L)) in thee sameme period,riod, thee 
firm doeses nott investvest in correctiver ective activity.ctivity. But ifi E(L) is 
greaterater thann thee alternativernative return,turn, thee firm doess 
l m ?ive 
investst in correctiverective activity.tivity. Iffa firm isi  inspectedpected in theeI  
policyli  period,riod, thee penaltiesnalties )'i are thee expectedected coststs of  
noncompliancecompliance with eachch penalizednalized violation.l tion. 
y  
THE  ENFORCEMENTCEMENT PROGRAMSS OF  OSHA  
The Initialiti l Inspection Programlm th 
The valuelue off E(L)( ) isis estimatedtimated ini  thet e followingf ll ing 
7 manner.nner. ‘I Fiscalis al 19777  isi  thet e policylicy periodriod withinit in 
whichich estimatestimates arere made.de. The probabilityr bability off initiali itial 
inspectioni ection IX isis estimatedtimated by dividingi i ing thet e numberber off 
initiali itial inspectionsi pections by thet  numberber off regulatedr gulated firms.fir s. 
(IL 
InitialI iti l inspectionsi pections arer  inspectionsi ections 10 thet e policylicy periodriod 
thatt t arere nott follow-upsll  of  previousevious inspectionsi pections ini  thet e 
samee policylicy period.riod. Violationsi l tions arere off twot  types:t pes: 
seriousrious andd nonserious.nserious. The percentagercentage off detectedtected 
violationsi l tions thatt t arere seriousrious andd finedfi ed isis thet e proxyr xy forf r 
d,. thet e percentagercentage of penalizednalized violationsi l tions thatt t arere 
in 
;.• ' 
serious.rious. A  similari ilar estimatestimate isis madede forf r penalizednalized 
A,. The sum of .1.I,1 andd .1. 2 isinonseriousserious violationsi l tions .1. 2 ' ,
unity.ity. Averagerage penaltiesnalties forf r seriousrious andd nonseriousserious 
violationsi l tions ).1 andd A. 2 arere estimatedstimated by dividing totalt tal 
penaltiesnalties by thet e numberber off violationsi l tions withith penalties.nalties. 
The percentagercentage off initiali itial inspectionsi spections thatt at penalizenalize 
1, I, (dividing 
violationsi l tions n isis estimatedstimated by thet e percentagercentage off aUII ll 
inspectionsi pections thatt at penaJi1.e violations.i lations.nalize 
IdeallyI ally tltl ~ expectedpected lossl ss ini  tQuation (2)( ) woulduld bee 
estimatedstimated on ann industryi ustry basissis sinceince enforcementforcement 
levelsl vels cann bee expectedpected tot  bee relatedr lated tot  riskrisk levels.l vels. 
‘: equation 
Unfortunatelyf rtunately suchch datata arere nott available;vailable; rather, 
suchch estimatesstimates arere ma.dea e on bothth thet e statetate andd 
nationaltional levels.l vels. Tablele II displaysisplays bothth highi h andd lowl  
r ther. 
valueslues forf r eat:h palameter on thet e statetate levell vel andd thet each rameter 
st.mdard deviationeviation forr eachach parameter.ramet r. The meanean 
shownown isis thet e nationaltional mean.ean. Tchch?chelI’s 
tclndard 
Fromr  chychetrs 
inequality,i quality, thet e probabilityrobability off drawingrawing a sampleample 
observationservation whoseose valuelue isi  thanmoreore than, 3 standardtandard 
7 All enforument and comp\iar-:e datadata were obtained fromfro  thethe’ All ad wcm otbtainednforcemetttcompliarre 
Office of Management Data and Stalisucal Amdysis I( 1m). The dataoffice of ttnagement Data and statistical Antrysis 1:1977). Tke data 
on thethe numberof flnns were obtained fromfro  thethe ()fflC(: of thethe Presidenl 
(1973).(1973). 
on ttutnbfs of ftrms were obtaird Dffdd: of President 
1,TABLEBLE 1. of for 1977Estimatessti ates of Enforcementnforcement ParametersPara eters for FiscalFiscal 1977 
Highi  
Valueal e 
Lowo  
Valueal e 
Standardtandard 
Deviationiation Meanean 
initial in::pectionP 
Reinspec:iona~ 
penalty Y 
Initial im: ction 01 
einspedon OIR 
Seriousi  'P~ al ty l'1 
0.2629.  
0.7483. 483 
909.09.09 
0.0063. 063 
0.050. 50 
121.851.85 
0.0435. 435 
0.1535. 535 
159.379.37 
0.037. 37 
0.190.  
291.21.21 
y2 198.188.18Nonseriousserious penaltnalty 1'  
Percentr ent serious.\1 0.86. 6 
Percerir nonseriousA2 0.99. 9 
rious At 
rcent ri s.\  
Nonco,rirrliance Il 0.92. 2co... nliance n 
Expectedxpected lossloss E(L) 34.70.70 
iossEp7(L1 29.84.84 
CL1 
Expectedcted i R(L) 
deviationsviations awayay from the meanan is 0.0027.027. In termss of 
thee losss parametersrameters E(LI thisis correspondsds to a limit of) 
- $12.42 to $20.22. These estimatesti ates suggestest that the~12.42 520.22. 
likely enforceme:nt impactact from OSHA  on firms isi  
insignificanti nt from zero.. so we arguee thatt the nationali l 
i rcement 
estimatestimates Clre both reliablel le and general.eral. This allows usar  
10 l:arfY the res/. of the discussionsi n in termsrms of theto c rry st 
nationaltional eMimatl >.sti ate ).
During jiscal 19777  thee initialitial inspectionpection ratete wassfi cal 
3.7..7. estimatcs appliedplied to approximatelyproximately 96 percentrcent oftimates 
alll  firms. A  fiml thatat had not beenen initiallyl  inspectedcted ini  
fiscali al 197797  andd wass ini  noncomplianceli nce could expectect a 
i.rrns. irm 
wst of 53.90 for noncompliance.pliance. This impliess thatt ancost S .90 
lO\e!>iment ini  correctionction yieldedl ed a returnturn of $3.90.90 toInv sL ent 
thc firm thatt hadd not beenen initiallyl  inspected.ected. In 197474e ti  
thet e National Asspciation of Manufacturerst rers surveyedrveyedtt al o i ti  
lh membersbers ass tot  thee sizei  01 thee investmentstment neccssary 
tot  correctct allll theirir violations.i l i s.”H Averagee estimatesti ates 
S35.00 tirms 
11s ol ce sary 
rangedged from 5 5.0  forr f s with 1000 or fewerer 
employees to overr $4.5.5 millioni  forr thosese with morerepl ~ 
thann 5000 employees.ploye s. With thee lowerr estimatesti ate ofooO 
535.000.S 5,ooO.a S3.90 associatedssociated withreturnturn of $ .90 wass a 
returnturn of 0.01.01 percentrcent on an invl.stment ini  correctionctioni e t ent 
m fiscal 1977. An alteruative investmentstment thatt yield,~d aIn t& l 9 7.An l rnative i l ,:d 
returnturn off 7 percent.rcent. forr example. wouldl  haveve gene­xample, ne-
ratedted S2.4SO ini  revenuevenue to thee firm. The datata ini  Tablele5 .450 u . 
I mdicate thatat firmsir s ini  noncomplianceco pliance andd nottI In icate 
mitldl1) mSilt:\.).:d duringring fiscaliscal 197797  werere likelyely touuttdily tns;ti,‘  
haveave chc'scn alternativelternative investmentsvestments as longg as correc· 
non Investments noncompetitive ratesates 
csen s o rec-
lion im'cstmcnts wereere yieldingielding oncom~titivc 
off return.eturn. 
Ifi  a firmir  wasas inspectedi spected oncence ini  anyny off thet e policyli y 
periods.riods. thethe pen.alties wouldl  becomeecome thet e expectedxpected 
cited penalized 
n lties 
wstscosts forr eachach violationti  u d andnd enalized. By 
multiplyingltiplyi  thethe dverageverage numberber off violationsi ti s perer 
mllial inspectioni spection byy thethe penalty. ann estimatestimate off thethenunal enalty, 
• S« (JCCIIpQIIOflaJ Haumis (1974. p.p. S).’ esLccu nond ads ( 1374. 8). 
11.79.79 30.5 1.51 65.75.75 
0.01. 1 0.2334. 334 0.46. 6 
0.14. 4 0.1100. 100 0.54. 4 
0.15. 5 0.2259. 259 0.49. 9 
0.50. 0 5.44. 4 3.90. 0 
0.76. 6 16.14.14 20.06.06 
averagerage costof an initial inspectionti  isi made.e. Thisiscost 
would have appliedl  to approximatelyi tely 4 percentnt of all 
firms ini  fiscall 1977.77. The averagerage number of  seriousi sti s 
violations with penaltieslties per initial inspecti.."\o wasi ection 
0.19. 9 ini  fiscalal 1977;77; the averagerage number of nonseriousri s 
violations \\'ith penaltieslties per initial inspectionti  wasAGth 
044; the estimateti te of the averagerage costs of initial 
inspectionstions was $103.26.3.26. The imposition of this cost 
would have beenn consideredi red trivial by firms in this 
categorytegory facedced with the alternativernative of an investmentt ent 
, 
unreiated to correction.tion. The initial inspectionction pro­
exertim! an 
l ted -
gram of OSHA  had the likely effectffect of xerti",~ 
insignificantifi nt from zero impactct on the resourceurce allo­ll -
cationti  of firmss inspected once during fiscalal 197777 sinceectlxl 
thee initiall inspectionction programra  prodUced insufficientu d i fici  
in':entivcs forr increasingsing firms'::ontrol efforts.ff rts.ia: i es ti ’ c trol 
The Reinspectioni ection Programir  
OSHA  alsol  enforcesforces thee OSH Act throughl r h thee 
reinspect ion of firmss previouslyvi sly determinedtermined out of 
compliance.pliance. An estimatesti ate isi  madede of E&!-k 
i spection 
R(L). thee 
expectedpected costt of continuedti ed noncomplianceli nce forr firmss0C 
nott reinspectedi spected and nott correctingr cting violations detected 
duringri  initiall inspections.ections. This costst is estimatedsti ated byy 
i cted 
redefining thee policyli  parametersrameters ini  equationation (2)) 10t defining to 
nmespond to OSHA's reinspectioni spection program.ram. The 
subscriptbscript R willill denoteote thisis correspondence.r spondence. 
correspond ’s 
The valucs of ,'RI' I'RI' andnd OR remainain unchangedanged 
C-om initiali i i l illirt 1.. 
l es ;‘R,,ia,. n  
['om theirt eir counterpartsterparts Tablel  
Unfortunately, datata arere unavailableavailable tot  e1itimate newewll f rt l , s i te 
valueslues forr theset ese parametersrameters ini  relationl tion te. thet e reinspec­
tionti n programr ram of OSHA.. The usese of thet e initiali i l valuesl es off 
thet e parametersarameters I'iyi and Ai,$ probablyr ably prod.:.lces under­
o inspec-
rodu s er-
estimatesstimates forf r thethe truetr e valuesalues off thesethese parametersrameters sinceince 
itit isis likelyli ly thatt at inspectorsi ectors wouldl  citeite alldnd penalizeenalize 
continued reinspec-D i ed violationsi ti s detectedetected duringri  thethe r inspec­
tions morere frequentlyf quently andnd severelyseverely than thosethose de-e­(i ns t u 
&ted I,tected during the initial inspection.ection. The usee of .1. 1 
produces a,, sir.ceprobablyably r duc:cs an underestimateerestimate of lit I &e 
reinspectionsarere to focuss on the seriousri s violationsi  ofns~ioDS 
inspecGons9 A2initiall ections.9 Consequently,uently, II is probablyably an 
ART yioverestimaterestimate of .1. It 2- The usese of 7; probablybl  producesuces 
under&mate ofyIi sincean eRStimate f}' tl in«:  it is likely that inspectorsctors 
continuedproposese higherr penaltiesalties for : t  violations.i s. 
The conseqUClHlensequence of usingi  nIl ass a proxy of nllxIt is 
indeterminateterminate sincei  therere arer  no data on the relativel tive 
d3ferences complianceiO' ences in complianc:e ratestes betweentween the two typeses 
Still E&.)of inspections.ctions. tiD the estimatessti ates of ,p..) providei  
informationtion on the coststs off continuedi  violations forr 
firins sutlicientm  and indicate whetherther ffi i nt incentivestives existist 
fo: corn~tion:, thee rec i  of violations citedd and penaiizednai zed 
previouslyi sly by OSHA  in the samee policyl  period.ri d. The 
aRisestimatedprobabilitybili off reinspectioni pection 01 It i ted bydividing 
the numberr of reinspectionsi ections by the numberr of initiall 
inspections.ctions. The sizei  of the standardard deviationi tion of 
E&)RtL) allowsl  us to carryrry out this discussionsi  on the 
nntionalati l level.el. 
Table I displaysl  the reinspectioni pection policy parametersra eters 
E&J. Theand the estimatesti ates of ~L). he percentagercentage of initiall 
reinspectionsinspectionsctions followedd by i spections in fiscalal 1977977 
19. lirmswass 9, implying thatt roughlyly I percentrcent of allll f  
were year.”::re reinspectedi spected during thisi  r. I 0 Witht  an estimateti ate 
$35,tMM correction.of ,000 for the necessaryes ary investmentt ent in ction, 
fiscala returnrn of $20.06.06 in l eal 197777 is associatedsociated with a 
r-turn:m  of 0.06. 6 percentr ent on an investmentt ent in correction.ction. 
investmentOn the other hand,, an alternativernative stm<:nt yieldingl i  
g Aerates i;ra returnr  of 7 percentr ent fierates $2.450.450 :l revenuenue to 
fitm.the lll. The data in Table 2 indicatete thatt firmss thatt 
werere initially inspectedcted but not reinspectedi ected werere likelyl  
have chosen siilbz invest-to w f'lt n alternativernative investmentst ents nce st­
mentsts in correctionti  yieldedl ed noncompetitiveetitive ratestes of 
reinspectionreturn.rn. The ection programr  had the likely effectffect 
ofexertingrting an insignificanti t fromzeroimpactt uponthe 
resourceurce allocationsi  of firmss that weree in-initiallyl  ­
spectedcted but not reinspectedected during this period.i . 
penalties yR,If a firm is reinspected,ected, the lties}' Iti becomeo e the 
expectedected costs for eachch violation cited and penalized.alized. 
By multiplying the averagerage numberr of violations perr 
reinspectionection by the averagerage penalty.lty, the costt of 
reinspections 1ections is estimated.ti ated. This costt appliesli s to the I 
percentent of all firms thatt experiencedrienced reinspectionsections in 
theeachch period.i . Becausese therer  are no data on l,~ averagerage 
numberr and averagerage penahies perof  violations a.lti s 
reinspection. estimatfesection, the initial inspectiontion ti at'es of the 
previous sectionti  are used.d. The averagerage cost of 
fiscal 1977reinspectionction in e 1977 was $103.26,3.26, amountingti  to 
of0.34areturn  percentnt on an investmentent in correctionti  
Division 
IDlhis estimate deriwd a a~ his 
*• See PKJ~IXIIrogram and Policy isioo (1976).). 
10 bis ci IIte is  ved by multiplyinglti l i  0 by OR in lhis period. 
!§?5,OUOof $~~,<XX} andd representingresenting a noncompetitiveco petitive ratete of 
returnt rn to thee firm.i . The reinspectioni spection programram of 
OSHA  exertedxerted an insignificanti ifi nt from zeroro impactact on 
the resourcesource allocationsll ti ns of firmss reinspectedinspected oncece 
duringi  thisis period.riod. 
RegremiottAnalysis NoncompliiA  a -ion ...ysis of noompliance 
relation-Regressionssion analysisalysis testssts the directioni ction of thee l ti n­
shipi  betweentween noncompliancepli nce and thee employmentploy ent of 
enforcementf rcement parametersra eters by OSHA.. An, obviousviolJS 
problema l  is thee selectionlection of the appropriateropriate definitionfi iti  
noncomphiance.of co pliance. An extremetreme definitionfi ition wouldl  be 
one or morere violations of thee entiretire setet of standards;tandards; 
noncompliancepli nce is a zero-one- e decisioncision andd probablybl  
tirm non-everyry regulatedulated li  would be determinedtermined in ­
compliance.li nce. On the otherr hand,d, noncompliancepliance can 
be vieweded ass a problemlem of degree,gre , in whichi h degreesgre s of 
determined Ihenoncompliancepli nce arere te:, ined by thee vigorr of t  
definedenforcementf rcement programram and noncompliancepliance is li ed 
in@encedby adherenceerence to standardsdards and is alsol o flu  by 
ll definedabovediscretionarytionary authority.thority. We usee n l atabove ass a 
allow: OSHA  tomeasuresure of noncompliancepli nce sincei ce it l ~
 
interpretr ret noncompliancepliance (;ontinuouslyc l  and is ex-
­
e~nploymentpectedted to exhibiti it a relationshipi i  to its 'nployment of 
enforcementf rcement parameters.ra eters. 
obtained by ordinar}The following estimateti ate is u i ed h  ) 
leas!-squares stdtesi-squares usingi  data from the 50 ates in fiscalal 
1977:77: 
l-l=0.107+0.839~+0.323a~+0.00+, +0.002~2n  0.  0. 9cr 230: R O.OO4}' I ,' l 
(1.62)** (2.14)= (1.56)**(0.977).977) (2.20)*. 03* . r . t' . 6)+* 
(t statistic)tistic) (3)( ) 
R=l =0.23 
F(4, 47)) =3.59*. ’  ~. 
The abbreviationsr viations for eadl of the parameterseters 
definedfi ed abovee and one and two asterisksterisks referfer to 
ch are 
confi<leJice level!> 0" 95 and 90 pelcent, respectiv~;y. 
Noncompliance I I measuressures the:ate : t  of noncompli­
ficlel  l vels or rcent. pectively. 
l:  j li-
thatancee n t is a joint probabilityil  (i.e.,. ., the probabilityili  of 
being initially in:'1Ccted and beingi  penalizl::d, giveni .w  nalized, 
initial inspectiOl I. Alll the enforcementf rcement parameterseters 
exer;rt a positivei i  impactt on noncompliance,pliance, which 
reinforcesrces delinition of noncompliancepliance as a 
ectiol 1. 
the f
measuresure of enforcementrcement vigor.. This implies thatt in 
jurisdictionss t  wherere OSHA  citess a relativelytively high 
l :s. 
percentagentage of timlS for noncompliance,li nce, theyy ,ue more 
rel<1tively high econormr: 
iir s .are 
apt to empleylc  a lati ly use of omu; 
sanctions.ti s. and theiri  employmentl ent of enforcemente ent 
parameters is in the proper direction,tion, consistentnt with’h 
the de;inition of noncompliance.pliance.Gnition 
cONirLI.!SIONC CLU  
The examinationi ation of the OSHA  enforcementf rcement programra  
indicatestes thatt OSHA  hass not been %L:,2ssfulH.... ;es fulerl in 
achievingi ving its goall of increasedased work pl.ace vrotectioll.l  p ction. 
Impactsacts from roth the initial inspectio'n and reinspec­
.ion programsra s on the resourceource allocationsi s of firmss 
b ctic‘n i spec-
have likelyl  beenen insignificanti t from zt'ro. Analysis of 
the datata on the nationali l levelel leadsds to reliableli ble and 
ero. 
generalr l results witht  regard to the e:;timates on the 
statet  level.l. Althoughlthough the regressionssi  analysis indicates 
that the employment of enforcement parameters is 
ziti ates 
positivelyi l  related to noncompliance,ia e, the impacts from 
the initial inspection and reinspectioni  programs  are 
i cts 
too weak to significantly increase tb<: complianceia ce of 
firms. If  OSHAA is increase the injury control  
hr
I . to 
resourcess or firms above that general::d in the privatef td 
market.. it must increase the costs oC noncomplianceliance 
rates of return on 
f
to the point of equality with the ~ s 
:tlternative investments.ts. As the modei of  enforcementa i  
mdicatcs. lhe goal of  increased work  place protectionIn e . t  
requiresires increasesreases in the  employmentployment of enforcement 
parameters.ram ters. 
0f .tl cement 
Ourr major conclusion  and tn"l of previous studies(aat
is that the enforcement program of OSl-IA hass nol 
pr&uced complianceia  by firms.. 
0 H.  t 
tXlul:ed additionalal h  
Weidenbaum and Delina (1978)) find that t.he.he compli­eide h  iina -
ance costs resulting from OSHAA regulation were $3.2.c-
hll:i,.m in 1976. Att first this appears as evidence that 
excrttd'  a significant impacit upon the 
bG.~n lY
OSHAA has e h..
compliance of firms. but in perspectiveti  this compli­, m -
am~ cost averagess only $640 per investmentt expendi­
lute h) each of  the approximately  5 millioni n firms 
non -
t r ~ l
under regulation by OSHAHA.” I I apThisis expenditure ­
pear~ very small but may be explained by consideringars b rq’ )
lhdtlirms invested in occupational  injury  control  longt a  li
hefore the arrival of OSHA Since pot{:ntial hazardsbc r HA. e ti  
1:05t the firm. among many other items. lost produc­cos , -
I, ion and risk compensation  to workers,er , it is in the 
.nlcrrsti te e~  of the firm to investt in injury  control  
1:yuipmcnt. OSHA. 
.irm 
':4uip cnl. Even withoutt t A, changes in worker  
,,:haracteristics. firm output. productionti n methods. andl r cteristics, l  , ,
depreciation of existing equipment would  generateteIJ
mestmcnt expenditures by firms. Ins t e  } .” 2 
II See Office of  thee ncsil1enl (1973),‘ kc Prcstden~ 19 . 
It Supporting evideoci: of IIus cllplanation is thai no relalionship2 qqnxti i ence 011sr tion l t l tionship 
betwseen OSHA  aclivity andd thee inveslmenl behavioravior of linns hass?ws en tivity n ent fm  
)Cen foundnd (VISCUSI 1979)9)‘x ~rust
Twoo lirmtationsli t ti ns ofthis studyt y and theirt i  implicationsi li tif i  
for publicli  policyli  willill now be addresr.ed. First. thetressed. i , 
analysislysis isi  limitedli it  by thet  levell l of thet  data If OSHA. 
lUempts tot  limitli it theirt ir enforcementf rcement etron tot  a smallllItt  ff rt 
gll'Oup of firms. itit isi possiblesible for thist i group thatt t OSHA 
has exertedrted a significanti ifi nt impacti t upon injuryi j  controlt l 
ro  tinn , M 
d4~isions.' J Such a subsetet of  firmsi  mayy be selectedlected 
owingi  tot  theirt i  relativelyl tively highi  injuryi j  rates.tes. Giveni  itsit  
limitedli it  budget,t, OSHA  mayy be ablel  tot  exert 
ecisi ns.” k 
n a 
significanti i i t impacti t un theset se firmsi  by conamtrating itsito  centrating 
enforoement reso~ on a select group off them.t em. In thist i  
casese OSHA  mayy be merelyrely actingti  ini  a rationalr ti l 
mannerr tot  makee thet  bestst use of  itsit  limitedli it  budget.et. 
Second,d, itit isi  nott clearl r thatt t itit isi  ini  thet interesti t r st ofsocietyi ty 
for OS?&4 tot  increasei ase significantlyi i i tly thet  coststs of 
forcementesources k t 
HA 
noncomplianceli ce thatt t itit imposesi s Oll firms.fir s. Att thet  
macroeconomicroeconomic levell el such actionsti  mayy leadl d tot  
on 
increased productt pricesi s and forcee certaintain firmsfir s outt of 
business.i s . Such pricei  and unemploymentploy ent increasesi ases 
needd be analyzedlyzed as coststs tot  societyi ty of regulationl tion and 
be comparedred withit  thet  projectedj cted benefitsefits from thet  
governmentr ent program.ram. 
j sed 
The authorthor wouldl  likeli  tot  tlank PaId B.. Downingi  and thet etlxmk ul 
anonymousy ous refereesr f rees forf r helpful comments.ents.l rUl 
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